Noor Saada
Moro is success. These days, the term “Moro” is a badge of honor especially for those who are in sync with the government of the day in the autonomous region, manifested in a line in the region’s hymn, “Bangsamoro’y tagumpay” (The Bangsamoro is success). It stands for a history of resistance and pride.
Yet for others, this very term raises hard questions about belonging, who speaks, and being spoken for. Though often associated with the 13 historically-identified Muslim ethnolinguistic groups in Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan, the Moro identity extends beyond ethnicity, religion, and political boundaries to become an imagined landscape shaped by colonization, cultural translation, and the ongoing quest for self-determination.
Colonial Birth. The term was first used in the Philippine context by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, the Spanish conquistador, who arrived in the archipelago in the 16th century. Borrowing the term from Spain’s centuries-long struggle against the Moors of North Africa and Andalusia, Legazpi and the Spanish colonizers used Moro to label the largely coastal and insular Muslim inhabitants of the Philippine islands, particularly in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan.
The term was used to mark not just religious difference but political defiance. These Muslims were different from the “heathen highlanders” and the “docile Indios” of the Christianized North. Unlike the highland Lumad or Igorot groups who lived outside the reach of the colonial church-state apparatus, the Moros had their own centralized sultanates, maritime networks, and transregional Islamic identities that connected them to the Nusantara (Malay world), and the Islamic ummah (global community).
In this way, the term began as an exonym, a name imposed by the colonizer to define the enemy. Over time, however, especially in the regime of minoritization, it was reappropriated by the colonized indigenous population as a symbol of resistance and constructed nationhood (bangsa).
Inclusion – Who are in. The post-colonial reassertion of Moro identity centered around the so-called “13 ethnolinguistic groups”: Badjao, Iranun, Jama Mapun, Kagan, Kolibugan, Maguindanaon, Meranaw, Molbog, Panimusan, Sama, Sangil, Tausug, and Yakan. These groups share not only a common Islamic faith but also a history of resisting colonization, firstly against the Spanish, then the Americans and Japanese, and finally the post-independence Philippine nation-state.
While useful in political and legal frameworks such as the peace processes and the creation of the regional autonomies, it also risks essentializing a complex and dynamic set of identities. It leaves out many others who share the same historical geography, religious beliefs, or cultural ties, but who do not fall neatly within the 13 ethnic identities.
Exclusion – Who Gets Left Out. What of the Teduray, Lambangian, and Dulangan Manobo, among others, who are indigenous to Mindanao but are not Muslim? They live within the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, yet their ancestral claims and cultural lifeways often remain peripheral in the dominant political discourse?
What of the Sama Dilaut (Badjao), seafaring, stateless, and often discriminated against, even by their land-based fellows?
What of the Jama Mapun and Molbog of Palawan, whose connection to Islam is deep yet whose marginality continues?
What of the mestizos, those born of Moro and Christian Filipino parents, or those who have embraced Islam through marriage or conversion?
What of Muslim reverts, Filipinos from Luzon or the Visayas, or even foreigners, who embraced the Islamic faith and chose to live among Muslim communities in Mindanao?
What about the descendants of the Lannang (Chinese), Arab, and similar Southeast and South Asian identities living in our midst?
Does a Moro identity requires bloodline? Land? Language? Or merely faith?
Blood, Faith, or Belonging. If being Moro is about blood, then we risk creating an exclusionary ethnonationalism that denies the hybridity and migration that have long characterized Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan.
If it is about faith, then we must ask: is every Muslim in the Philippines a Moro? Are Mindanawon converts or urban Muslims in Manila part of this imagined community?
If it is about lived cultural experience, then being Moro must include those who speak the language, participate in rituals, honor the maratabat (dignity), respect the adat (customary law), and uphold the collective memory of struggle.
If it is political, then the term becomes not just a cultural label, but a revolutionary one, an assertion of a historical grievance and a demand for justice, recognition, and self-rule. But what happens when the politics falter, when unity frays, or when governance fails to live up to the ideals?
How about those who assert the primacy of their ethnicity: they are Bangsa Sug, Bangsa Sama or Bangsa Iranun over and above their Moro-ness? Are they less of a Moro?
Reimagination. An inclusive identity must reckon with these tensions. It must honor its history of resistance, but also evolve to reflect the pluralism within its region. The legacy of Legazpi’s colonial label must be undone not merely by inversion, that is, wearing it as a badge of honor; but also, by transforming it into an inclusive identity of justice, dignity, and cultural integrity.
To be Moro is not only to descend from gagandilan (warriors), membership in the revolutionary group or speak a native tongue, but to be part of a living history, of a people shaped by the ecology and the collective struggle, by the Quran and the kulintang, by adat and amanah (trust), by memory and movement.
Moro is a name we have adapted and reshaped to suit and define our collective struggle and quest for self-determination. It is an identity not just exonymically acquired, but lived, chosen, and contested. It is not a category closed by blood or birth, but an unfolding story of a people still becoming and coalescing.
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